Over the past two decades, international criminal law has been increasingly institutionalized and has become one of the dominant frames for defining issues of justice and conflict 
Human law, culture, and convention are never perfectly just, but justice needs human law, culture, and convention to be articulated and enforced. There is a fundamental inadequation between our sense of justice and the products of culture, but we can only express this inadequation through the cultural means at our disposal…Hence, our laws are imperfect not because they are bad copies of a determinate Form of justice, but because we must articulate our insatiable longing for justice in concrete institutions, and our constructions can never be identical with the longings which inspire them. 2 The implication is that because positive laws and institutions are imperfect articulations of justice at best, they should always be open to contestation and revision. Specifically, existing institutions need to leave room for alternative articulations of justice and thus refrain from attempts to monopolize discourses on justice.
The caution against the monopolization of discourses on justice is even more pertinent when claims are made in the name of 'global justice'. Adding the adjective 'global' implies that something bigger and higher is at stake than in the case of 'local', 'ordinary' or 'national' justice. In the case of 'global' justice, the issues concerned transcend the values, institutions and interests of directly affected communities. The promotion of global justice is invoked as a justification for interventions by outside agents acting in the name of the values and interests of a cosmopolitan community. However, the global society in which global justice is supposed to operate is even more pluralist than its domestic or subnational counterparts.
Within the pluralist global society, numerous articulations of justice coexist, overlap and compete. 3 Conceptions of global justice that effectively silence or marginalize alternative interpretations of what is just are therefore deeply problematic (just like 'non-global' conceptions of justice that do the same). Defining socio-political issues in terms of 'global' requires openness to the various alternative articulations of justice that could be longed for, experienced and struggled for in the situations at hand.
In theory, international criminal law and the aim of protecting diversity, including diversity in conceptions of justice, go hand in hand. For one of the justifications for the international criminalization of certain conduct is that this conduct amounts to, in Hannah Arendt's famous words, 'an attack on human diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic of the "human status" without which the very words "mankind" or "humanity" would be devoid of meaning'. 4 To Arendt, plurality -'the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world' -is so essential because all politics and human action are conditional upon it: 'While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality is specifically the condition -not only the conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam -of all political life.' 5 In this sense, the quest for justice also presupposes plurality, because articulations of justice can be questioned, challenged and revised only through human (political) action. Plurality, therefore, is essentially related to what it is to be human: 'Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is,
human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live.' 6 In sum, for Arendt, crimes against humanity are international crimes because they transcend domestic boundaries; and they transcend domestic boundaries because they are an attack on human diversity as such. Crimes against humanity threaten the very conditions for politics and human action by corrupting the idea that the world is a place to be shared by peoples living in a multitude of cultures, habits, identities and indeed, conceptions of justice. 7
Of the various justifications for international criminal justice, the Preamble of the Rome Statute establishing and governing the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) also reflects the rationale of protecting diversity, acknowledging as it does the existence of a pluralistic humanity in the form of 'peoples (...) united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage', while expressing concern 'that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time' by 'unimaginable atrocities that shock the conscience of mankind'.
At least part of the rationale for the establishment of the ICC is thus to achieve accountability for crimes that constitute an attack on the idea of a pluralistic humanity. Through the prosecution of some of the crimes within its jurisdiction, the ICC is to promote and protect diversity.
Arendt's justification for international criminalization of certain conduct is one among many and cannot be regarded as the justification for international criminal law. irrespective of its other rationales, should itself never undermine the fundamental aim that it is meant to promote: the protection of diversity.
To be sure, we do not directly attribute this argument to Arendt, for whom the need to protect human diversity mainly functioned as a justification for international criminal law. 9
However, now international criminal law has established itself as one of the dominant frames through which political conflicts are read, it is necessary to rethink the relation between international criminal law and the need to protect human diversity. May it also be the case that international criminal law is endangering the very plurality it is meant to protect?
We argue that there are indeed signs that international criminal law runs the risk of undermining one of its own foundations. This paradoxical phenomenon is the end-result of four inter-related developments. First, international criminal tribunals are constantly confronted with the gap that Jack Balkin identified between the ideals of justice, on the one hand, and the institutional and political realities in which they operate, on the other. They have been created to satisfy a longing for global accountability, redress for victims and fairness for accused, but in practice only part of the world is called to account, victims find little redress in international criminal proceedings 10 and accused's fair trial rights suffer from humanity, for instance, Renzo, in contrast to Arendt, has argued that it is the inhumane nature of certain crimes that turns them into matters of concern for international criminal justice; what counts is the 'the violation of a value, humanness, which is offended by these crimes'. The third development is that, partly as a consequence of this tribunalization, international criminal law has become an increasingly popular frame for defining issues of justice. The framing of political issues in terms of international criminal law already occurred before the spread of international tribunals, as is illustrated by the 'crime of apartheid'.
However, with international tribunals enforcing the law, international criminal law has turned into an even more powerful frame to articulate injustices and to pursue political causes.
Whilst the tribunals' physical enforcement powers may still be weak, its normative power holds sway all over the globe: irrespective of any actual court proceedings, those targeted by international criminal law are branded as enemies of mankind, whereas those who can side with the enforcement of international criminal law can rebrand themselves as friends of humanity. 13 The importance of international criminal tribunals thus goes way beyond the few cases that they try. As a result of the tribunals' work, international criminal law has become an important frame for the interpretation of the world. . suspected of mass crimes will face justice. The Tribunal has proved that efficient and transparent international justice is possible.
The Tribunal has contributed to an indisputable historical record, combating denial and helping communities come to terms with their recent history.
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The Tribunal openly takes pride in having established what it regards to be the accepted norm for dealing with conflicts and mass atrocities.
The fourth development is that many of these situations have been framed not merely In sum, in response to its shortcomings, international criminal law is increasingly expanded and institutionalized. As a result of that institutionalization, socio-political problems are more and more framed as matters of international criminal law, while international criminal law is ever more presented as the road to global justice.
The Dark Side of the Monopolization of Global Justice
This process of increased institutionalization, framing of issues as matters of … a light which shines brighter and brighter on a few people and the rest are in darkness, wiped out. They simply can't be seen. … you stop seeing something and then, slowly, it's not possible to see it. It never existed and there is no possibility of an alternative. 
Alternative Conceptions of Justice
We give five examples of possible alternative conceptions of justice 25 and illustrate how with the increasing equation of international criminal law with global justice, it has become more difficult for political groups to prioritise diverse conceptions of justice in a way that does not put international criminal law on top.
The five examples became apparent during research in Uganda and Sudan. Against this background, three preliminary clarifications are in place. First, we present these examples as alternative conceptions of 'justice' because they were presented as such, that is to say, as forms of 'justice'. We intentionally refrain from adopting a fixed definition of justice. Indeed, our argument is based on the recognition that justice is an inherently political concept, 26 the meaning of which is and must be constantly subject to political contestation.
Secondly, we present neither of these alternative conceptions as inherently better than any of the other conceptions, including international criminal law. Recognition of the aim of protecting diversity should foreclose attempts to monopolise or close-off discourses on justice by invoking 'local' as presumably more 'authentic' articulations of justice just as much as it should foreclose such attempts by the invocation of international criminal law.
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Finally, it must be stressed that our argument is not a cultural relativistic one. We do not argue that the explanation for the alternative conceptions of justice is found in cultural differences; the alternative conceptions of justice that we discuss probably exist, to a greater or lesser extent, in all societies. How such societies prioritise these conceptions of justice will depend on the context. For instance, below we show how the Acholi, an ethnic group in northern Uganda, opposed ICC action against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), at least partially on the ground that international criminal justice does not amount to 'justice' and that the justice they prefer is a justice that restores rather than punishes. However, the same people criticized the ICC for not investigating and prosecuting state actors; for state actors, 25 We do not claim to provide an exhaustive overview here -there may of course be more conceptions of justice. Our attempt is to sketch some prevailing conceptions of justice we encountered in our own field work. Nor do we claim that the boundaries of the conceptions of justice discussed here are water tight: many of the conceptions are overlapping. Our aim is to provide an overview of different emphases in conceptions of justice. The court system is justice through punishment. The offender and offended are put aside. This leads to polarization which will lead to death. 33
Instead, the Acholi leaders emphasized the merits of their own justice and reconciliation mechanisms.
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To some extent, this advocacy for an alternative conception of justice was successful:
donors provided funding for the organization of Acholi justice and reconciliation events and one of the mechanisms, the mato oput ceremony ('drinking the bitter root') became not only part of the national vocabulary, but also gained international attention. 35 Scholars, international lawyers and transitional-justice activists visited northern Uganda to study the mechanisms.
However, Acholi justice and reconciliation mechanisms did not succeed in becoming an equal alternative to the framework of international criminal law. Since the ICC intervention, international criminal law was the international point of reference for 'justice' in Uganda. Acholi justice and reconciliation mechanisms were thus evaluated from the perspective, and within the framework, of ICC-style justice. More specifically, the question was whether the Acholi mechanisms could be used to challenge the admissibility of the rather than provide compensation, to focus on the perpetrator instead of the victim, and to turn cleansing ceremonies into accountability mechanisms. For his part, an ICC judge, indeed the Ugandan judge, publicly stated:
Crimes against humanity, genocide, aggression against other states and war crimes are internationally condemned and cannot be tried by traditional courts but by the ICC … You cannot expect someone who caused the death of 100 people to be tried in a traditional court if you are looking for justice to be done … You must convince the international community that justice was done and that the punishment is proportionate with the crime. Rajagopal calls the 'somewhat tragic reality that resistance must work, to some extent, within 'Alternative' suggests that another mechanism is the standard, whereas for many people it is not. Moreover, official and local justice mechanisms are often complementary and not alternative. 'Traditional' may raise the incorrect impression of a static mechanism, whereas local justice mechanisms are alive, contested like other cultural practices and hence dynamic (see also E. 
B. Alternative Conception II: Ending Ongoing Violations
A second example of an alternative conception of justice is that of ending ongoing violations, which usually means ending the conflict in the context of which the crimes take place. Thus, when a Darfurian who had stated 'We need NATO, the EU and the ICC' was asked why Darfurians needed the ICC, the conversation continued as follows:
For justice.
What is 'justice'?
Justice is the end of the war.
How is the ICC going to end the war?
By arresting President Bashir and his party.
And then?
Once there is peace in Darfur, the ajaweed [respected elders] will do real justice. 
What is real justice?
Real justice is done through judiya [a mix of mediation and arbitration between groups, resulting in compensation and arrangements for future co-existence]. In other places of the world, too, we have seen that arrest warrants that are difficult to enforce may make conflict more intractable, and thus may make the resolution of conflict, necessary for the ending of crime, more difficult. 45 To the extent that the idea 'no peace without criminal justice' underpins international criminal law, it does so as a principled idea (an idea about right and wrong which cannot be easily resolved with reference to evidence) rather than as a causal idea (an idea about cause and effect, supported by evidence). 46 When international arrest warrants in fact make the conclusion of a peace agreement more difficult and therefore in effect lead to a continuation of the conflict and crimes, the pursuit of one type of justice (the enforcement of international criminal law) may thus prevent the realization of another type (the end of a conflict and the crimes committed in the context of that conflict). 47 The Acholi leaders stated that they had asked the Prosecutor 'that he is mindful of our traditional justice and reconciliation process and that he is also mindful of the peace process and dialogue'. 48 On his part, the Prosecutor echoed that he was 'mindful of traditional justice and reconciliation processes and sensitive to the leaders' efforts to promote dialogue between different actors in order to achieve peace'. 49 The Government of Uganda criticized the encounter between the Prosecutor and the Acholi leaders, arguing as it did that it was not the role of community leaders internationally to take political positions that went against that of the Government. 50 As a compromise, a new delegation was sent to The Hague which included, in addition to Acholi community leaders, many people affiliated with the Government. This time, the Prosecutor and the Ugandan delegation agreed on a joint statement and proclaimed:
The Lango; Acholi; Iteso and Madi community leaders and the Prosecutor of the ICC have agreed to work together as part of a common effort to achieve justice and reconciliation, the rebuilding of communities and an end to the violence in Northern Uganda.
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Seemingly similar to the first statement, this statement was fundamentally different in that it no longer referred to the one issue on which the ICC and the local leaders disagreed: the importance of a peace process. The Acholi leaders had insisted that a peace process was essential for ongoing violations to end, and thus for justice. But this conception of justice was eliminated from the joint press statement released by the ICC.
Almost a decade later, Acholi opposition to the ICC has diminished. The primary reason is that as a result of the Juba peace talks, the LRA has left northern Uganda and has become less of a direct threat to the Acholi. In northern Uganda, the situation is relatively Representational Practices', supra note 10, at 255-256. 56 Victims are particularly dependent on these decisions if they aim to obtain reparations as victims in a particular case. Some of these factors are less relevant in the work of the Victims' Trust Fund, which can provide assistance to victims in a situation more broadly, irrespective of the guilt of an accused, but obtaining reparations from the VTF is more a matter of charity than of right. 57 Nouwen's discussion with two Acholi elders, Gulu, September 2008.
E. Alternative Conception V: Justice as Equality
Finally, one other example of an alternative concept of justice is that of equality -not material equality (which relates more to distributive justice) but to equality before the law.
International criminal justice institutions have often delivered partial justice -this is not to say that they are biased in a specific case, but that they cannot address all crimes and therefore select. Such selection is not problematic if the criteria used relate to, for instance, the seriousness of the crime or the potential deterrent effect of the prosecution. What is more problematic is that in fact selection has also been influenced by a host of external factors, including the extent to which co-operation is likely to be forthcoming. At the domestic level, In response to criticism of partial justice, the selectiveness has been justified on the ground that it is the result of an impartial assessment of what global justice requires.
However, this only exacerbates the experience of injustice. Take for example how the ICC Presidency responded to the critique of the African Union that the ICC was targeting Africa:
The ICC operates strictly within the mandate and legal framework created by the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the Court, and cannot take political factors into account. Decisions are taken independently on the basis of the law and the available evidence and are not based on regional or ethnic considerations.
58
Of course, it is hardly surprising to find the Presidency of the ICC denying external influences on its decisions. Yet, the response from the ICC to the African Union intensifies the experience of injustice by presumptuously denying the legitimacy of concerns about the geographical bias of the Court's selection procedures. The statement conveys that all the Court does is applying objective standards, and those who feel uncomfortable about the outcomes apparently fail to see how global justice is to be done by the ICC.
Faith in international criminal law will make the international justice cup look half full rather than half empty: it is better to have some accountability than none. But if some groups or regions are targeted structurally while others are not, those who drink from a different justice cup, namely that of equality, will see the levels of justice in their cup going down as a result of the pursuit of international criminal law: more international criminal justice means the entrenchment of existing inequalities and thus less justice.
Beyond endless complementarities, towards self-restraint
We argue that these alternative conceptions of justice have been pushed to the margins by the increasingly dominant use of international criminal law to frame and thus to understand political issues and by tendencies to equate international criminal law with global justice. We do not criticise international criminal law for not itself promoting these alternative conceptions of justice. First, it is not international criminal law itself that is responsible for its own dominance -the promotion and prioritization of the international- 61 By referring to an investigation concluded by a decision 'not to prosecute', article 17(1)(b) suggests that investigations must have the potential to be followed by prosecution. Moreover, article 1 provides that the ICC 'shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions'. Read in this context, 'investigation' in article 17 probably does not cover investigations by commissions of inquiry that can only recommend that other bodies further investigate with a view to prosecution. 62 See also Drumbl, supra note 24, at 143: 'Complementarity … may encourage heterogeneity in terms of the number of institutions adjudicating international crimes, but homogeneity in terms of the process they follow and the punishment they mete out.' endless 'complementarities' in which all conceptions of justice always seamlessly 'complement' each other. The real issue is not whether both restorative justice and distributive justice, as well as equality before the law and retributive justice can be pursued -which is obviously possible -but which conception of justice prevails in times of clashes or limited resources. In a world of horrific constraint, conceptions of justice compete for their realization.
In this political struggle, institutionalization serves to construct, defend and expand the values promoted. The institutionalization of international criminal law is a way to construct, defend and expand one particular type of justice, namely that of individual criminal accountability. As it is, other conceptions of justice than international criminal law do not enjoy similar institutionalization at the international plane and are thus in a weaker position.
The result is that international criminal law, with all its international tribunals enforcing it, is overpowering other conceptions of justice. In doing so, it threatens precisely one of the longings for justice that international criminal law was meant to realise:
international criminal law was meant, among other aims, to protect human diversity; the idea that the world is made up of a multitude of individuals and cultures with their own perspective of history, identity and, importantly, justice.
The analysis that the dominance of international criminal law is due to its international institutionalization might suggest that, for a better protection of pluriformity, alternative conceptions of justice should also receive international institutionalization.
International institutionalization could ensure that those other conceptions of justice are better protected and promoted at the international plane, for instance, through a global reconciliation commission, a global wealth distribution fund or a global equality commission.
However, even then, such institutions may become subjected to one dominant discourse on justice that prevails over the other, for instance, in arguments that serious offenders must be taken to international criminal courts, whereas the smaller offenders can be taken to a truth and reconciliation commission. Fundamentally, what is necessary is not more institutions to fill a 'vacuum' or a central institution from which to administer pluralism, but protection of precisely that 'vacuum' or the creation of space without a central justice administrator. A space must be protected where the meaning of justice can continuously be contested. At present, this requires first and foremost that the enforcers of international criminal law respect the limitations that flow from at least one of the rationales for international crimes: the protection of diversity. For the need to protect a pluralistic humanity not only offers a possible justification for international criminal law; the very same idea also sets significant limits to the project of international criminal justice. One such limit is that one particular type of justice, international criminal justice, cannot make an exclusive claim to global justice, a hierarchically superior type of justice.
A space must be protected that secures our awareness of the gap between our institutions and our ideals. 63 This calls for a qualification of the faith in institutions, including in international criminal law. 64 Whilst faith may bridge the gap between the awareness of shortcomings today and the hope for a future in which these shortcomings have been overcome, it makes one forget, ignore or deny that human law, culture and conventions will always be short of the justice we strive for because justice is mediated by men. The denial of this mediation, for instance in assertions that international criminal law does justice (instead of strives for it) or that it represents justice (rather than imperfectly mirrors an ideal) sows the seeds of intolerance, no matter how liberal the origins of international criminal law. 65 Justice, not unlike democracy or the rule of law, needs limitations on its enforcement and space for contestation for its preservation.
